Issue 265, Friday 27 May 2011 - 23 Jumad al-Akhar 1432
Yemen after Saleh: A future fraught with violence
By A Correspondent
President Saleh refusing to relinquish
power
As the Arab Spring has penetrated the Arabian
Peninsula, there is much talk nowadays in
every part of Yemen about change and the
toppling of President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s
regime that ruled the country over the past
three decades. And this is the first time in
Yemen’s history that Yemeni people
participate in a ‘revolution’ that is raging
across the northern and southern parts
despite a rebellion in the former and a
growing secession movement in the latter.
Yemen’s veteran Saleh, 65, describes ruling
Yemen like ‘dancing on the heads of snakes’,
but this time he got an abrupt bite that will
dislodge him soon. The question is, will
these snakes continue to exist or will they
be engulfed by the tide of change with the
end of Saleh’s rule? Analysing the current
situation in the country, the mistakes and
policies of Saleh’s regime over the past 33
years will have negative effect on the post-
youth revolution period. Two major scenarios
people always fear have gradually appeared on
the surface: sectarian violence and internal
conflict.
Since the unification of its northern and
southern parts in 1990, Yemen has gone
through various stages, which was
significantly reflected on the social aspect.
First there was the mixture of two societies,
one being Marxist and the other tribal and
conservative; then there was a civil war in
1994, which toppled the socialist
sovereignty, followed by a rebellion in the
north in 2004 and a secessionist movement in
the south in 2006; in addition to the
resurgence of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula. These factors markedly re-shaped
the Yemeni society.
Following the new multi-partisan system in
1990, new Islamic powers existed to take part
in the political life. On top of these was
Islah Party (or described as Muslim
Brotherhoods of Yemen) who are mainly Sunnis;
this movement was so influential that it
spread throughout Yemen. In the meantime, the
Shi’a Zaidis tried to be counterpoised with
the Sunni expansion through establishing a
political party known as Al-Haqq, which was
established by Hussein Al-Houthi, who first
led a Shi’a-led rebellion in the north in
2004 and was killed in the same year by
Government troops.
As the Islah party won more seats in the
Parliamentary elections, some extremist
members of Al-Haqq party thought
participating in politics was useless as they
believed in the Guardianship of the Jurist
(Wilayat Al-Faqih) as is the case in Iran. A
new movement was therefore created named as
the ‘Believing Youth’ and today known as
Houthi group. The fighting continued until
2010, during which the rebels managed to
control Saada Governorate and some districts
in Amran, Al-Jawf and Hajjah neighbouring
governorates.
Rebel leader Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi managed to
establish religious centres in other areas,
including Sanaa and Dhamar governorates.
During the fighting with Government forces,
the rebels maintained good relations with the
Yemeni Socialist Party and showed solidarity
with the Southern Movement that calls for
secession of southern Yemen. But at the same
time they [Houthis] carried out attacks on
Sunni-oriented tribes that backed the
Government in its wars to quell the
rebellion. While the Islah party was
successful at the political level, the Houthi
group managed to establish itself as a
powerful entity with autonomy ambitions.
The indications of a sectarian violence
between the Sunni and Shi’a sects are taking
place days in some parts of the country. At
Sana’a’s Change Square where thousands of
demonstrators have been staging protests for
over three months, the two rivals have
quarrelled over who should lead the protests.
Sunni protesters refuse to pray behind a
Shi’a Imam and vice versa. Early this month,
Sunni tribesmen from Marib Governorate went
to Al-Jawf Governorate to fight against
Houthis who tried to control local authority
premises. A reliable source told The Muslim
News of a recent incident in Saada that a
citizen’s home was set fire as he refused to
obey a Houthi judge’s order.
Hostility between Sunnis and Shi’as is also
evident in Amran Governorate, home to the
biggest tribal confederation known as Hashid,
where Al-Ahmar family is based.
In an interview with a Saudi newspaper in
March, Hussein Al-Ahmar, brother of Hamid who
is believed to be the biggest threat to
President Saleh, said they will not allow for
Houthis to rule Yemen. Earlier he warned the
Houthis of any attempt to intervene in ‘his
tribes’.
Apparently, it will be difficult for the next
regime to re-take the areas already
controlled by the Houthi group. The latter
have fought the Saleh regime over the past
six years to have their own independent
region and therefore will not easily give up
the control. As President Saleh puts it,
“Houthis will never accept [the rule of] the
Muslim Brotherhood.”
Another sect that is on bad terms with Sunnis
are the Bohras, a branch of Shi’a Ismailis.
The Bohra members are among the rich
businessmen of Yemen and are supporting the
Saleh regime because Sunni scholars say their
sect contradicts with true Islamic teachings.
Sufism is yet another sect in Yemen that,
along with the previous two Shi’a sects, is
concerned with the domination of the Sunni-
oriented Islah party. A prominent Bohra
member was killed this month in Sana’a
Governorate, but still it is not clear the
reasons behind this incident.
The future of Yemen will be predominately of
sectarian concerns.
Militancy
Saleh came to power in 1978 at a time when no
one accepted to embark on this position as
two earlier presidents were killed. Since
then Saleh has built very strong relations
with tribal confederations and religious
leaders to ensure a safe reign. However, he
has used divide-and-ruled tactics and
succeeded in obtaining the loyalty of these
tribes by giving them autonomy and regular
financial incentives.
This policy has significantly undermined the
state’s influence on tribal-governed areas.
As an evidence of this are abductions, tribal
conflict, bombing oil pipelines are common
place. The army and security forces have also
been attacked by armed tribesmen.
The state’s failure to control tribal areas
has on the other hand allured Al-Qa’ida
members to take refuge there and at times
have been provided protection by some
tribesmen. It is the same state weakness that
has led to the existence of a Shi’a-led
rebellion in the north and a secessionist
movement in the south.
More of a worry is the regime’s social
support mobilisation and provocation, which
observers say will trigger violence. A Friday
preacher in one of Sana’a mosques was harshly
beaten up by people as he criticised the
President in his sermon; another imam was
beaten up as he encouraged people not to take
part in anti-government protests.
Earlier this month, an army unit in one of
Sana’a Governorate districts trying to move
to Marib Governorate was stopped and attacked
by armed tribesmen who also seized a number
of military vehicles and a tank. Pro-
government tribes in the same area launched
attacks against the offenders at the behest
of the regime.
All these indicate that Saleh supporters will
bear their teeth when a new regime will try
to enforce law; so is the case with tribal
sheikhs who wield independent power.
President Ibrahim Al-Hamdi, who ruled
northern Yemen from 1974 to 1977, was
assassinated as he tried to end tribal
loyalty and Yemen’s medieval social classes
by proclaiming all Yemenis as equal. Under
his rule, leaders of Hashid and Bakil - the
largest tribal confederations in Yemen - were
marginalised. A few weeks ago prominent
tribal figures, including Al-Ahmar family,
announced their support for the youth
revolution in order to maintain the same
tribal status and be credited in the success
of the ‘peaceful revolution’.
The new regime will face many difficulties in
dealing with the troublesome tribes; any
procedure to cut the regular financial
contributions and annual ‘allocated’ job
opportunities will inevitably end up with
armed conflicts.
Moreover, Saleh’s latest speeches to his
supporters were characterised with a tone of
incitement. “We will face a challenge with a
challenge,” he recently addressed thousands
of his supporters. He also made it clear that
after leaving office, he will act as an
opposition and topple the new regime.
Then there is the Southern Movement, which
first sprang in late 2006 and has gradually
changed to an armed group as they carried out
a series of assassinations against security
officers. A Ministry of Interior report said
254 soldiers and officers were killed between
2009 and first half of 2010 by the Southern
Movement and another 1,900 were injured.
Yemen has been classified as a failed state
and “many worry Yemen is the next
Afghanistan.” Desperate poverty coupled with
high rates of illiteracy and unemployment are
widespread nationwide. At the political
level, Yemen will have a new map, with new
political and religious coalitions. Yemen
will not be a great gift for the next regime
as it has to dance with a new family of
snakes; and as the proverb goes, “As I lost,
so will you!”
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